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Recent Treaties and Statutes
ADMIRALTY-AMENDMENT
ACT-CHARTERER

TO

FEDERAL

CONCLUSIVELY

RIZE LIENS FOR NECESSARIES AND

MARITIME

PRESUMED

TO

LIEN

AUTHO-

REPAIRS

Prior to August 10, 1971, supplier-creditors' who furnished
necessaries 2 to a vessel by order of a charterer and his agents had been
precluded by subsection R of the Ship Mortgage Act 3 from acquiring
a maritime lien on the vessel if the charter party contained a
prohibition of lien clause.4 While a shipowner and his agents were
conclusively presumed to authorize encumbrance of the vessel,' the
charterer and his agents were rebuttably presumed to possess such
authority. 6 The presumption could be rebutted by proof that the
charter party-always available on the ship for inspection by the
supplier-creditor-included a prohibition of lien clause. Because of
the ease of rebutting the presumed authority of a charterer, the
1. Supplier-creditors include terminal operators, stevedores, chandlers, repairmen and other materialmen who furnish goods and services on the credit of the
vessel.
2. 46 U.S.C. § 971 (1970). Necessaries are defined by maritime case law. See
generally In re Burton S.S. Co., 3 F.2d 1015 (D. Mass. 1925).
3. Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1970).
4. A prohibition of lien clause in a lay, see Thomas v. Osborn, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 22 (1856), or an installment sales contract, see The S.W. Somers, 22 F.2d
448 (D. Md. 1927), likewise precluded encumbrance of the vessel by the owner
pro hac vice or the conditional vendee in possession. 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1970).
Prior to the Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 605, liens on vessels for
wages, supplies and repairs could be created by a conditional vendee, in spite of a
contractual agreement to the contrary. See The Sea Witch, 34 F. 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1888); Hawes v. The James Smith, 11 F. Cas. 869 (No. 6238) (D. Mass. 1858);
The Ferax, 8 F. Cas. 1147 (No. 4737) (D. Mass. 1849). Otherwise, 46 U.S.C. §
973 was essentially a codification of maritime case law. W.A. Marshall & Co. v.
S.S. President Arthur, 279 U.S. 564 (1929); The Coaster, 273 F. 609 (W.D. Wash.
1921).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 972 (1970).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1970).
7. Dampskibsselskabet Danneborg v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268
(1940); Diaz v. The S.S. Seathunder, 191 F. Supp. 807 (D. Md. 1961). Subsection
R ends: "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer a lien when the
furnisher knew or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that
because of the terms of the charter party ... the person ordering the repairs,
supplies, or other necessaries was without authority to bind the vessel therefor."
46 U.S.C. § 973 (1970).

inclusion of a prohibition of lien clause in a charter party became
accepted practice.' Since the in rem procedure was unavailable,
American supplier-creditors were assuming a substantial risk of loss of
unpaid credit as against foreign flag vessels under charter.' Congress,
after hearing testimony from American stevedore and marine servicing
organizations and shipowners' representatives, 10 concluded that the
foreign flag vessel owners should bear the risk of loss of unpaid credit
since they could easily shift the loss to the charterer by contract
bond. " Subsection R of the Ship Mortgage Act has been amended so
that a charterer and his agents are conclusively presumed to authorize
encumbrance of a chartered vessel for repairs, supplies, towage and
other necessaries furnished. 12 Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. §
973 (1970), as amended, Aug. 10, 1971, Pub. L. 92-79, 85 Stat. 285.
The contractual or quasi-contractual maritime lien hypothecates a
vessel in an in rem proceeding. "3 The hypothecation of a vessel is a
pragmatic procedure that satisfies the needs of maritime commerce 4 In
order for a vessel to be profitable, services and supplies must be
readily available to minimize "dead," "turn around" and "in ballast"
time'" and to maximize time at sea with cargo. 1 Services and

8. 7 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1859, 1860 (1971).
9. Id.
10. The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House of
Representatives heard testimony that stevedores in the San Francisco Bay area
had sustained two million dollars in losses. Id.
11. 7 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1861. Regardless of the terms of
the charter party, the charterer or his agent encumbers the vessel with a maritime
lien upon the non-payment of ordered supplies or services. If the charter party
contains a prohibition of lien clause and performance bonding clause, the
encumbrance of the vessel by the charterer constitutes a breach of contract which
would allow the shipowner to collect the contract bond as indemnification.
12. Section 973 now reads: "The officers and agents of a vessel specified in
section 972... include such officers and agents when appointed by a charterer,
by an owner pro hac vice, or by an agreed purchaser in possession of the vessel."
13. See Harmer v. Bell (The Bold Buccleugh), 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (1851).
The maritime lien is the foundation of the in rem proceeding. The hypothecation
of the vessel perfects the supplier-creditor's non-possessory, inchoate security
interest in the vessel.
14. See Dampskibsselskabet Danneborg v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268
(1940). See generally 4,885 Bags of Linseed, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 108 (1861).
15. This proposition is true for any mode of transportation, regardless of the
element to be traversed-land, sea or air. The more time spent in outfitting,
repairing or traveling without paying cargo, the lower the overall profitability of
the carrier.
16. W.A. Marshall & Co. v. S.S. President Arthur, 279 U.S. 564 (1929).
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supplies for the vessel are more readily available when the suppliercreditor is certain of payment in a credit transaction. 7 The lien in
rem procedure gives the supplier-creditor a relatively sure and simple
means of securing the credit extended to a vessel. In turn, security
facilitates the servicing and supplying of a vessel and maximizes the
profitability of carriage. 18 Therefore, maritime liens are given not to
protect the supplier-creditors, but rather to promote and benefit
maritime commerce. 19 Since maritime liens are secret, 2 0 they can
work great hardships in the maritime community unless they are
strictly limited to situations of maritime necessity 21 and customary
usage. 2 2 In The General Smith, 23 the Supreme Court held that under
general maritime law there was no lien for supplies 24 furnished to a
vessel in its home port. 25 In The Lottawanna, 26 the Court declined to
overrule The General Smith and called on Congress for corrective
legislation. 2 7 Congress responded in 1910 and 1920 with the Federal
Maritime Lien Act. 28 The Act abolished the home port-foreign port

17. This is a basic proposition of any credit transaction. It is especially true in
maritime commerce, where the credit extension can take place thousands of miles
from any source of satisfaction of the credit other than the ship itself. The Edith,
94 U.S. 518 (1876).
18. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1
(1920). See also The Fearless, 14 F.2d 1004 (D.N.J. 1925), affld, 14 F.2d 1006
(3d Cir. 1926). The lien is a privileged claim on a vessel in respect to service or
supplies which facilitate the use of the vessel in navigation. The Westmoor, 27
F.2d 886 (D. Ore. 1928).
19. See generally United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923); The South
Coast, 251 U.S. 519 (1920); The Valencia, 165 U.S. 264 (1897); The Kate, 164
U.S. 458 (1896).
20. The lien is neither possessory nor perfected by the common law means of
a filing that constitutes public notice of the security interest. See, e.g., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9, §§ 401-02.
21. The Minnie and Emma, 21 F.2d 991 (D. Md. 1927);In re Burton S.S. Co.,
3 F.2d 1015 (D. Mass. 1925).
22. Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 490 (1923).
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819).
24. The same rule was applicable to certain services. See, e.g., The Alligator,
161 F. 37 (3d Cir. 1908).
25. The Court presumed that a supplier-creditor did not intend to rely on the
credit of the vessel. The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409 (1824). A state
created lien for home port supplies could be enforced in federal admiralty courts.
The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893).
26. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
27. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 581-82.
28. 46 U.S.C. § § 971-75 (1970).
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distinction 2 9 and eliminated the necessity of proving that the credit
of the vessel was relied upon when the owner or his agent contracted
in person or was in port when the supplies were ordered. 3 Finally,
the Act codified the existing maritime principle that the supplier
furnishes supplies on credit to a chartered vessel at his own risk. "
The amendment of Subsection R portends significant consequences
for the international maritime community and American maritime
jurisprudence. First, the amendment represents a radical departure
from the traditional English, European and American maritime
principle that the charterer cannot bind the vessel for services and
supplies that he must furnish. 32 Secondly, while reaffirming the
purpose of the maritime lien to facilitate profitable carriage, 3
Congress considers the lien a security device created primarily for the
benefit of the supplier-creditor and closely related to the common law
mechanic's lien. 3 In this respect, Congress fails to perceive the
fundamental differences between maritime and common law liens,
especially the inherent danger of a secret lien. 3 ' Thirdly, the

29. See generally The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
30. W.A. Marshall & Co. v. S.S. President Arthur, 279 U.S. 564 (1929); In re
Burton S.S. Co., 3 F.2d 1015 (D. Mass. 1925).
31. Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 373, 36 Stat. 604; New Bedford Dry Dock Co.
v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96 (1922). See, e.g., The Kate, 164 U.S. 458 (1896); The
Patapsco, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 329 (1871); The Yankee, 233 F. 919 (3d Cir. 1916).
See also Thomas v. Osborn, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 22, 29-31 (1856).
32. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 29-30. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57
& 58 Vict., c. 60, did not change British maritime case law. There is no lien for
necessaries or repairs for a vessel. While the claims of supplier-creditors,
"necessaries men," rank as non-maritime claims, see The Zigurds [1932] P. 113,
the supplier-creditor who has retained possession of the vessel obtains a ranking
possessory lien similar to the common law materialman's lien. The Immaculata
Concezione 9 P.D. 37. See also Jacobs v. Latour [1828] 5 Bing. 130. Since the
supplier-creditor has no maritime lien or similar charge against the vessel, he
cannot proceed in rem if his contract was made with a demise charterer. See
Smith's Dock Co. v. The St. Merriel [1963] 2 W.L.R. 488. See generally 11
STEVENS BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS paras. 74-75 (1963).
33. "Granting the materialman a lien encourages the prompt furnishing of
necessaries to vessels so that they can be speedily turned around and put to sea.
This is especially significant today .... " 7 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1861.
34. Id. at 1859.
35. See generally Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260
U.S. 490 (1923). The classic example of the danger of the secret lien and
prejudice to a good faith purchaser for value is found in Harmer v. Bell (The Bold
Buccleugh), 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (1851).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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shipowner now bears a risk of loss neither contemplated in the
negotiations nor shifted to him by the terms of the charter party.
Almost all charter parties presently in force have a full performance
bonding clause and a default clause. 36 When the amount of the bond
was set, the shipowner contemplated that the prohibition of lien
clause would operate to deny supplier-creditors a maritime lien.
Therefore, the amount of the bond would be patently insufficient
should the vessel now be libelled in rem. Further, the default clause is
a nullity when the vessel is in custodia legis pursuant to an action
under the amendment. Fourthly, the application of the amendment to
charter parties engaged and liens and proceedings arising before
August 10, 1971, has not been decided. " Before the amendment can
be declared retrospective, it must first defeat the presumption of
prospectivity. The amendment must then survive due process or ex
post facto analysis. 38 Total prospectivity-applying the amendment
only to charter parties contracted after August 10, 1971-would
emasculate the statute. Since most charters are at least five years in
duration, the supplier-creditor would be required to ascertain the date
of every charter for at least the next five years to be reasonably
certain of his rights and remedies. This result would benefit neither

the supplier-creditor nor maritime commerce, as it would create two
rules of maritime lien law. Total retrospectivity-applying the amendment to all charters and recognizing a lien for supplies furnished
before enactment "-may put an intolerable strain on judicial
administration 4" and concepts of due process. 4 1 Partial retro-

36. The terms of American and European (Gencom) demise charters are
essentially the same. See, e.g., N. HEALY & B. CURRIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 408-11 (1965).
37. There are no cases to date in the federal courts arising under the new
amendment.
38. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1966).
39. The lien may be considered final when cut off by laches. See G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 482-83 (1957).
40. The strain on the judiciary is more theoretical than actual since no cases
were reported in the first six months of the amendment's enactment.
41. The classic test of retrospectivity is whether the statute affects substantive
rights or affords a procedural remedy. See, e.g., Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511
(1885). "In the case of The Society for Propagatingthe Gospel v. Wheeler, 2 Gall.
139, Mr. Justice Story thus defines... a retrospective law: 'Upon principle, every
statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.'" 114 U.S. at 519.
Spring, 1972
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spectivity-applying the amendment to all charters but only recognizing a lien for supplies furnished after enactment-would be a possible
solution. This approach would validate congressional intent by
applying the amendment uniformly to all charters while minimizing
due process objections. Finally, by securing the credit extended by the
suppliers, the amendment aids the foreign bare-boat charterer in
acquiring supplies and repairs in American ports. In effect, a charterer
is considered a shipowner when dealing with supplier-creditors of
necessaries. While congressional analysis of maritime liens may not be
satisfactory, the redistribution of risk of loss seems equitable and
reasonable. The amendment will not injure financially responsible
foreign charterers or shipowners and should be a positive benefit to
American supplier-creditors.
Arthur R. Louv

A lien which "attached" before August 10, 1971, may be two or three
"voyages" old by the time a libel in rem is prosecuted under the amendment.
Conceivably, the lien could survive laches and operate to impair the rights of
current "voyage" claimants (foreign or American), despite Supplemental Rules C
and E of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After the proceeding in rem, the
liens of these claimants will have been "scraped clean" whether or not they had
actual notice of the proceeding. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 39, at
482-83. A court could easily consider the combination of a retrospective
attachment of a lien under the amendment with an in rem proceeding as
fundamentally unfair. Retrospectivity of the amendment and the proceeding in
rem could destroy or impair the vested maritime rights of the most recent
claimants.
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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-MASSACHUSETTS

JUDICIAL EXTENSION

ACT-STATE LEGISLATURE EXTENDS JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS

TO 200 MILES AT SEA

The Massachusetts Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries
released a report informing the state of an impending ecological
disaster involving all of the important commercial fishery species of
the Northwest Atlantic, including those found in the Georges Bank
area, 50-100 miles off Nantucket.' In calling for emergency unilateral
United States action,2 this position paper cited numerous factors
which, collectively, have led to the depletion of marine fisheries.3
Prior Massachusetts law empowered the Director of Marine Fisheries
to promulgate regulations affecting marine fishing within the "coastal
waters" of the Commonwealth. 4 The present Act was passed to avert

the approaching disaster and prevent the possible annihilation of
adjacent marine resources.' The Act empowers the Director of Marine
Fisheries6 to adopt any new rules and regulations necessary to
preserve and protect all marine fishery resources to a distance of 200
miles out to sea, or to a point where the water depth reaches 100

1.

MASS.

MARINE

FISHERIES

ADV.

COMM'N,

SPECIAL POSITION

PAPER prepared by Frank Grice, Director, Division of Marine Fisheries.
2. "Realistically, this could best be accomplished by unilateral or bilateral
action by the nations most traditionally involved, the United States and Canada."
Id. at 6.
3. Among the factors listed as contributing to the depletion of the fisheries
were: "pulse fishing"-intense efforts in a particular fishery until it is no longer
able to be fished economically; massive fishing by Soviet and European fishing
fleets which utilize increasingly effective techniques; inadequate scientific
knowledge of the damage created by such thorough fishing; and inadequate
preventative regulations by the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries. Id. at 1-6.
4. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, §§ 17-17A (1965), as amended (Supp.
1971). The approval of the Commissioner of Natural Resources and the Marine
Advisory Commission [MFAC] was also needed. "Coastal waters" are equated
with "territorial waters." ch. 130, § 1. "Territorial waters" extend one marine
league from the extreme low water mark (three nautical miles). ch. 1, § 3.
5. The emergency preamble containing these findings was explicitly adopted
by the legislature. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 17(10)(Supp. 9, 1972),
amending ch. 130, § 17 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1971).
6. The amendment is to § 17. Thus, the requirement of approval by the
Marine Fisheries Advisory Commission and the Commissioner of Natural
Resources, which is contained in § 17A, is eliminated. The approval of the

Governor is still needed.
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fathoms, whichever is farther.' MA s s. AN N. LAWS ch. 130, § 17
(10) (Supp. 9, 1972), amending ch. 130, § 17 (1965), as amended
(Supp. 1971).

The constitutionality of the Massachusetts legislation depends upon
the answers to two separate questions:' first, whether the statute
conflicts with positive federal law and thus violates the supremacy
clause;9 and secondly, whether the statute conflicts with the general
body of decisional law relating to improper interference with the
federal foreign relations power. Initial indications of positive federal
action toward the establishment of an extended fisheries zone are
found in the Truman Proclamation of 1945.1 United States pressures
for international control of the Northwest Atlantic fisheries resulted in the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 1 The Convention granted the International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) power to propose
regulations 2 for species control in the Northwest Atlantic and to
carry out scientific investigation necessary for effective management
of the species within that area.3 Recent protocols to the Convention
extend jurisdiction to all signatories for purposes of insuring
7. 100 fathoms is approximately 600 feet and this is the depth at which

control of the continental shelf terminates under international law. See note 17
infra. Additionally, a maximum fine of $10,000 is established for violation of the
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to § 17(10).
8. See Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private
InternationalMatters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
10. Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945). This was evidence that

a change in United States policy regarding an extended fisheries zone was
forthcoming, but indicated that the United States would not follow the Latin
American examples of declarations of exclusive jurisdictional extensions. See
Garaioca, The Continental Shelf and the Extension of the Territorial Sea, 10
MIAMI L.Q. 490 (1956).
11. [1950] 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157, 16 U.S.C. § §
981-91 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1972). The Convention has been signed by a
great majority of the nations utilizing the resources of this region.
12. Proposals are not binding against signatories unless consented to. Id. art.
VIII.

13. This area encompasses the extended jurisdiction of Massachusetts. Id. art.
I, § 1. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Natural Resources complains that the
ICNAF concerns itself with species control only after the species has been

overfished to the point of annihilation, that the procedures for ratification of
proposals are lengthy and cumbersome, and that the Commission does not deal
with the real problem--total fishing pressure.

MASSACHUSETTs DEP'T NAT.
RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE, No. 1 (1971).
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compliance by ships and nationals of all other signatories. Moreover,

the protocols simplify and expedite the process of ratifying the
ICNAF's management proposals. 4 Enabling legislation in the United
States specifically prohibits state interference with the ICNAF that
might prevent the Commission from discharging its duties.
Additionally, the legislation states that this Convention neither
expands nor limits state authority to control fisheries.'"
Supplemental federal law was created by the United States'
ratification of the conventions proposed at the Geneva Conferences on
the Sea. These conventions reaffirmed the freedom of the high seas,
specifically the freedom to fish' 6 above the continental shelf' 7 and
beyond territorial waters. However, freedom of the seas is limited by a
contiguous zone not exceeding twelve miles in width,' 8 and is further
restricted by special interests of coastal states in adjacent high-sea
fisheries.' 9 The failure of the Geneva Conferences to cope with the
twin problems of the width of the territorial sea and the right to a
contiguous fishing zone resulted in unilateral federal legislation
establishing a contiguous fishing zone with exclusive United States
fishing rights.2" State jurisdiction is explicitly restricted by the Act to

14. [19701 1 U.S.T. 567, T.I.A.S. No. 6840, [1970] 1 U.S.T. 576, T.I.A.S.
No. 6841, 16 U.S.C. § § 981-91 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1972). For legislative
history see 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS 1379.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 981, 987(c)-(d) (1970), as amended (Supp. 1972).

Essentially, this was done to prevent disputes concerning regulation within the
territorial waters and to prevent extensions of state jurisdiction. 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3931, 3942.
16. Convention on the High Seas, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,

450 U.N.T.S. 82.
17. Convention on the Continental Shelf, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
18. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 2
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The Convention limits a

contiguous zone to four stated purposes, none of which involve fisheries
regulation. Id. art. 24, § 1(a).
19. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the

High Seas, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. This
Convention was more controversial and has been ratified by few of the major
fishing nations except the United States and the United Kingdom. Special
interests of coastal states will allow emergency unilateral action to prevent
annihilation of an adjacent fishery if the measures adopted are not discriminatory
to foreign fishermen. Id. art. 7.

20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970). The legislative history shows that all
factors were carefully weighed. Official comments of the State Department were
considered to insure that the Act did not invite reciprocal action against our
Spring, 1972
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territorial waters. 2 ' Acts of state legislatures that are contrary to, or
that interfere with, the laws of Congress are invalid under the
supremacy clause. 22 Positive federal law is most commonly created
through Congressional legislation and by implementation of
international agreements pursuant to the treaty power.2 3 Tests
applied by the courts to analyze conflicts between state and federal
statutes vary from the necessity of a conflict so "direct and positive"
that the two statutes cannot stand together,2 4 to a finding that the
state act "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 2
The essence of
these formulations is that state action may not interfere with the
carrying out of national purposes, as evidenced by positive federal
law 26 or by a congressional design to pre-empt the field.27 Another
basis for conflict is state interference with the foreign relations power
of the federal government. 2' The drafters of the Constitution
perceived that the states' inclination to adopt separate foreign policies
was inimical to the best interests of the nation.2 9 Unfortunately,
criteria for determining the existence of such conflicts and guidelines
for their resolution have been inadequately formulated by the
courts.3 0 The Supreme Court has responded to this situation with

far-sea fishing fleets. 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3282, 3283. The
committee also found that a trend toward a 12-mile jurisdictional limit was in
progress. Id. at 3286.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1094 (1970). "Thus, the amendment would recognize the
jurisdiction of the States within the 3-mile coastal area, but would disclaim any
extension of coastal State jurisdiction to the fisheries zone contiguous area." 1966
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3282, 3291.
22. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1972); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
23. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Such law may also be created

by executive action in act of state and sovereign immunity cases. See Maier, supra
note 8, at 134.
24. Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). This formulation of the
supremacy clause has been given continuous recognition. See 402 U.S. at 649.
26. United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552 (D.C.N.D. Fla.), aff'd, 319 U.S.
441 (1943).
27. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
28. Maier, supra note 8, at 134.
29. "The importance of national power in all matters relating to foreign
affairs and the inherent danger of state action in this field are clearly developed in
Federalist papers No. 3, 4, 5, 42, and 80." 312 U.S. at 62 n.9.
30. Maier, supra note 8, at 141.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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vague generalities. 3 Specific factual resolutions offer little more in
the way of adequate guidance. Three general tests were enunciated in
Clark v. Allen 2 for the court to consider in determining whether a
state's action is an unconstitutional interference with foreign relations.
These tests were followed, to some degree, by the last major Supreme
Court pronouncement in the area, Zschernig v. Miller."3 The three
Clark tests as interpreted in Zschernig are: first, whether there is an
improper purpose of interference with foreign relations; 34 secondly,
whether a direct impact upon international relations has been
shown;3 and finally, whether the state law has a possible adverse
effect upon the power of the government to carry out existing foreign
policy. 6 The Zschernig court found the state statute unconstitutional
on the basis of all three tests.37
A reasonable construction of positive federal law leads to the
inescapable conclusion that regulations promulgated under the
Massachusetts act will be held unconstitutional.38 Clearly the act is
contrary to the enabling legislation implementing the ICNAF, since
Massachusetts would be interfering with the regulations of the
Commission. 39 The statute also violates the implicit assumption of 16

31. Examples include: the "supremacy of the national power in the field of
foreign affairs," or "local interests versus national purposes," 312 U.S. at 62, 63;
and "adverse effect" or "direct impact" on foreign relations, 389 U.S. at 440,
441.
32. 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947).
33. "Consequently, Zschernig implicitly adopts all three of the tests for
unwarranted interference found in Clark but does nothing to clarify either the
extent to which each is applicable or the weight which each is to be given in later
cases." Maier, supra note 8, at 139.
34. Id. See also Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 32-34 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
35. 389 U.S. at 441. As construed in Zschernig, this direct impact is on
foreign relations generally-a vague test at best.
36. Both this test and the preceding one were seemingly combined, and thus
diffused. Id.
37. A notable exception is Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276
Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969). The California Court of Appeals
declared the California "Buy American" Act unconstitutional and in so doing
utilized all of the Zschernig tests, emphasizing the improper purpose test. 276 Cal.
App. 2d at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
38. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Natural Resources realizes that the
Act is unconstitutional, but appeals to a higher law-"conserving our living
resources." ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE No. 1, supra note 13.
39. Such interference within the territorial waters and impliedly beyond these
waters is excluded by the language of 16 U.S.C. § 987 (c)(1970).
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U.S.C. § 987 (d) that state control of fisheries is limited to territorial

waters.4" Additionally, the enactment is in opposition to the explicit
prohibition of 16 U.S.C. § 1094 on state control of the marine
resources beyond the territorial waters. The act also violates the
freedom of the seas by establishing restrictions on the freedom to
fish 4 ' beyond both the territorial waters and the limited contiguous
zone.4 2 Finally, Massachusetts is not the recognized forum from
which a national special interest in adjacent marine fisheries may be
asserted
under the
Fishing Convention.4 3
A finding of
unconstitutionality would, therefore, be necessitated by any
formulation of the tests utilized in resolving conflicts arising under
the supremacy clause. A court would hold either that the subject
matter has been expressly pre-empted by Congress,4 4 or that there is a
"direct and positive" conflict4 5 as well as a possible obstacle to the
accomplishment of congressional objectives. 4 6 If the statute is not
declared violative of the supremacy clause, it will certainly be declared
an unconstitutional interference with foreign relations. Application of

the first of the Clark tests would clearly invalidate the legislation as
having the improper purpose of directly influencing foreign relations.
Additionally, this act is a far cry from a mere inheritance statute: if
regulations are promulgated they will involve possible seizure of the
ships and nationals of other countries on the high seas, thus creating a
very direct impact upon foreign relations in violation of the second
Clark test. The statute also violates the third Clark test by inducing a
possible adverse effect upon foreign relations.4 7 This is especially true

40. "The fishing grounds are international; so are the problems that gave rise
to the Convention on which this bill is based. Thus, preservation and regulation of
the fishing must proceed on an international basis." 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3931, 3933.
41. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 16.
42. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note
18.
43. The state of Massachusetts did not contend in any way that it was
utilizing the emergency procedures of the Fishing Convention, and it is doubtful
that foreign states would recognize any attempt to do so.
44. 373 U.S. at 141.
45. 302 U.S. at 10.
46. 312 U.S. at 67.
47. See also Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J.
248, in which the author applies the Clark tests and finds unconstitutional the
1963 Florida Territorial Waters Act, designed to restrict fishing by aliens within
Florida territorial waters. Though a 1964 application of the Act precipitated an
international incident, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Florida conviction of
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in light of the continuing international conflict over the extension of
territorial waters and the careful attention that was placed on this
situation in drafting the 1966 contiguous zone bill. Obviously, the
major purpose of this Massachusetts law was to pressure the federal
government to move unilaterally to prevent the destruction of
adjoining marine fisheries. However, authorities on the problem of
fisheries control contend that the maximum sustainable yield can be
achieved only by international regulation, either by a single agency4 8
or through regional arrangements.4 9 They further contend that
unilateral action will be more harmful than beneficial."0 In any event,
the balancing of priorities necessary to develop a viable fisheries policy
cannot be dominated by local interests, no matter how forcibly
presented, and this will be perceived by any court deciding the
constitutionality of this statute.
Woodard E. Farmer,Jr.

several Cubans. Barrios v. Florida, 174 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 208
(1966).
48. See Eichelberger and Christy, Comments on International Control of the
Sea's Resources, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 299-308 (L. Alexandre ed. 1967).
49. Burke, A Contemporary Legal Problem in Ocean Development, 3 INT'L
LAW 536 (1969); Nomura, FisheriesJurisdictionBeyond the Territorial Sea, 44
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1968).
50. Unilateral action may be self-defeating as it may result in reciprocal action
against our far-sea fishing fleets. Nomura, supra note 48, at 327. Also this system
will not allow for the maximum sustainable yield to be calculated, nor encourage
unified management over migratory species. On the contrary, it will unduly limit
the freedom of the seas and prevent the necessary accumulation of scientific data.
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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-MINING
INTERNATIONAL

PROBLEMS

AND

THE

DEEP SEABED-

NATIONAL

RESOLUTIONS

The policy of the United States on submarine minerals was first
announced in the Truman Proclamation of 1945:1 national jurisdiction extends to the subsoil seabed of the continental shelf which is
beneath the high seas and contiguous to the United States coast.2 This
policy rapidly found acceptance in international law3 and was ratified
in article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.4 The
Convention states that a coastal nation's jurisdictional rights extend
beyond the 200 meter isobath to where "the depth of the superjacent
water admits of the exploitation of natural resources of the seabed
and subsoil."' Therefore, territorial jurisdiction is defined by two
conceptual parameters: extension and exploitation. First, although
there is a split of authority,6 article 1 has been generally interpreted
to mean that the jurisdiction of a coastal nation for mineral mining
purposes extends to the entire subsurface seabed as far as the
continental margin.'7 International custom has approved the assurance

1. Proclamation No. 2667, dated Sept. 28, 1945, captioned "Policy of the
United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of
the Continental Shelf," 3 C.F.R. (1943-1948 Comp.).
2. This proclamation has been argued to represent the traditional American
position with respect to seabed mineral jurisdiction. See Ely, United States Seabed
Minerals Policy, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 597 (1971).
3. 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
4. Convention of the Continental Shelf, opened for signature, April. 29,
1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective for the
United States June 10, 1964).
5. In discussing articles 1-3 of the Convention, the International Court of
Justice held in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that, although the doctrine
of the continental shelf was a "recent instance of encroachment on maritime
expanses which, during the greater part of history appertained to no-one,"
nonetheless the widespread international acceptance of the doctrine had established it as customary international law. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969]
I.C.J. 1, 51.
6. For example, some authorities have asserted that the continental shelf
extends only to the 200 meter mark and that the inclusion of the exploitability
test was to allow the development of adjacent areas. See COMMISSION ON
MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING

AND

RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND

(1969).
7. "While the matter is not free from doubt, the latter view [that the
Continental Shelf extends to where the continental slope meets the abyssmal
depths] appears to be consistent with the 'plain meaning' of the Convention and
the preponderance of evidence in its legislative history and has found support with
THE SEA:
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of such extended or "emergent" rights' in coastal countries Secondly,
the "exploitability" criterion of article I has been criticized as a trend
in favor of "creeping national jurisdiction." 10 Ultimately, the ten-

dency of coastal nations to favor extended national maritime
jurisdiction 11 has created a serious conflict between the traditional
doctrine of freedom of the seas and the equally traditional concept of
sovereign territorial rights. The proposed Deep Seabed Act would both
implement and revise the 1970 Draft Convention on the international
seabed, which was submitted by the United States in the United
Nations. Under the terms of the proposed Act, private exploitation of
the seabed area would be regulated by national licensing, subject to
exclusive national jurisdiction, with international license registration
and cooperation. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, S. 2801,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 12
In an earlier effort to reverse the unilateral extension of territorial
jurisdiction by coastal nations, the United States submitted to the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Deep Seabed
and Ocean Floor a draft convention on the international seabed. 13
The purpose of the proposal was to initiate negotiations concerning
the establishment of international controls over the mining of the
deep seabed. Additionally, the proposal provided guidelines for
interim legislation by coastal states pending adoption of the multi-

the Department of the Interior and most writers in this country. The broad
construction also appears to be consistent with the doctrine of the continental
shelf in customary international law." Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine
of the Continental Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 442, 475 (1970).
8. The International Court of Justice in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases
undertook to distinguish between "pre-existing" and "emergent" customary law
with regard to the offshore rights of coastal states. The I.C.J. thought that the
right of a coastal state to exploit the seabed adjacent to its coast was certainly
"pre-existing." On the other hand, how far the right of exploitation extended was
"emergent." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. at 39, 40.
9. [1969] I.C.J. at 33.
10. See Stevenson, The United States Proposalfor Legal Regulation of Seabed
Mineral Exploitation Beyond National Jurisdiction,4 NATURAL RESOURCES
LAWYER

570 (1971).

11. See generally Krueger, supra note 7, at 478-81.
12. S.2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 164 (daily ed. Nov. 2,
1971).

13. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.138/25; 9

INT'L LEGAL

MATERIALS

1046

(1970) (hereinafter cited as Draft Convention).
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lateral treaty. 14 The Draft Convention called for radical changes in
past policy. First, article 1 proposed a treaty which provided for
national licensing by coastal states for two areas: the area within the
200 meter isobath was to be subject to the coastal state's exclusive
jurisdiction and control; the area from the 200 meter isobath to the
continental margin was to become a "trusteeship zone" subject to
coastal state's jurisdiction. "s Additionally, a substantial proportion of
the capital assets generated from exploitation of the trusteeship zone
was to be transferred to an international regulatory agency. The agency
would then distribute these assets among underdeveloped countries. 6
More importantly, the Draft Convention spoke in terms of national
legislative implementation. Article 2 stated that no state might acquire
any right, title or interest in the trusteeship zone or its resources
except as provided in the Convention. 1" By not speaking in terms of
contracting nations in article 2, the apparent intention of the drafters
was to legislate for third-party states. Although article 34 of the
Vienna Convention does not allow a treaty to bind non-consenting
third parties, article 38 allows the operative law contained in a treaty
to become conclusive as to non-contracting states if it is so widely
accepted as to become a part of customary international law.8
Therefore, the thrust of the Draft Convention clearly indicated a
regulatory and not a contractual scheme, designed to cut back on
unilateral territorial claims of sovereignty over the high seas.

14.

Laglin, Past, Present, and Future Developments of the Customary Law of

the Sea, 117 CONG. REc. 190 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1971).

15. Draft Convention, supra note 12, arts. 27 & 75.
16. Draft Convention, supra note 12, arts. 27, 74 & 75.
17. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
18. Under article 34 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty "does not create

either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent." It is imagined,
therefore, that the proposers of the Draft Convention anticipated that it might
become so widely accepted internationally that it would obtain the status of
customary law-in which case third parties might be bound under article 38 of the
Vienna treaty. To avoid being subject to the provisions of the convention, a third
party state would have to offer some form of active resistance. That the
"customary law" approach was on the minds of the drafters in putting article 2 in
legislative form seems apparent. This technique, taken in conjunction with article
38 of the Vienna Convention, points all the more forcefully to a regulatory as
opposed to a consensual scheme. See generally Jennings, JurisdictionalAdventures at Sea- Who Has Jurisdiction Over the Natural Resources of the Seabed? 4
NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 829 (1971); Jennings, The United States
Draft Treaty on the International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 433

(1971).
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The proposed Deep Seabed Act is national interim legislation which
has been submitted to implement the terms of the Draft Convention. 19 First, the Act provides that the Secretary of the Interior may
grant licenses to mine the "deep seabed" to citizens or corporations of
the United States for a fifteen year period. 20 These licenses will create
rights which are exclusive as against all national subjects of the United
States and of any reciprocating state. 21 Secondly, an international
regulatory clearing house is to be created. The clearing house will
record notices of applications for licenses and the approval, denial,
transfer or relinquishment of these licenses.2 2 Thirdly, the Act
provides for a fund to be appropriated by Congress for the benefit of
developing, reciprocating nations? 3 Fourthly, in anticipation of the
full legal architecture contemplated by the Draft Convention, the
tenth section of the Act provides that the licenses are subject to any
"international regime for the development of the deep seabed ....

"

In

turn, the international regime must recognize the validity of granted
licenses for their respective terms and allow the United States to
reimburse any licensee for loss of investment. 24 Fifthly, the Act vests
in personam jurisdiction in the Secretary of the Interior over United
States miners and requires the latter to submit to the same authority
exercised by any reciprocating state. 2 Finally and most importantly,
the Act defines "deep seabed," i.e. the licensed area, as being the
seabed and subsoil vertically below, lying seaward of the United States
and of foreign states, as defined in the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf. 26
In an international context and as a matter of political reality, one
thing can certainly be said of the proposed Act: it is more acceptable
to the international community than is its counterpart, the Draft
Convention. Subject to section ten, the Act disregards the exclusivetrusteeship jurisdictional dichotomy of the Draft Convention. As is
apparent from its definition of "deep seabed," the Act makes no
provision for a "trusteeship zone." Additionally, the jurisdiction of
the proposed international regulatory clearing house, covering the
deep seabed, extends only to the area seaward of the continental

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,
S. 2801, 92d Cong.,

1st Sess. (1971).
1st Sess. § § 4(c), 5(a) (1971).
1st Sess. § 4(a) (1971).
1st Sess. § 5(e) (1971).
1st Sess. § 9 (1971).
1st Sess. § 10 (1971).
1st Sess. § 3(a) (1971).
1st Sess. § 2(b) (1971).
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shelf. Therefore, as defined in the 1968 Convention on the Continental Shelf, international jurisdiction would extend seaward of the
continental margin. Since the majority of minerals that currently can
be exploited are found within only the area known as the continental
margin, 27 such a provision would seem to be more conducive to
acquiesence by coastal states that desire to exploit the deep seabed
with a minimum amount of international control. In contrast, the
proposition contained in the Draft Convention that the capital assets
derived from within the continental margin should be heavily "taxed"
to provide subsistence for underdeveloped countries probably would
not be politically acceptable to any coastal nation, including the
United States. 28 Similarly, the Act appears to be far more realistic
than the Convention in leaving its substantive terms to the course of
future negotiations. For example, the proportion of assets realized to
be rendered to underdeveloped countries and the nature of the
international agency to be formed are subject to future negotiations.
Moreover, because the Act creates a right-duty relationship with
foreign nations only when reciprocating legislation is enacted by them,
the Act relies on international cooperation, rather than international
regulation, for its enforcement. There is no international mandate, as
in article 2 of the Draft Convention, which might give non-reciprocating states cause to fear that they will become subject to the terms of
a customary rule of international law without their own legislative
assent. These factors can only enhance the appeal of the Act among
coastal states anxious to protect their traditional spheres of offshore
jurisdiction. Finally, while it is arguable that any effort to reverse the

current proclivity of coastal countries to unilateral assertions of
national jurisdiction is futile, it is equally arguable that some
restrictions are necessary and perhaps even indispensable. The plight
of the small land-locked country whose access to seabed minerals and
fishery rights is limited presents a case in point. Formerly, these rights
were completely guaranteed by the doctrine of freedom of the seas.
Presently, they are being pre-empted by coastal state action. This small
example may serve as an indicator that a problem as broad as the
proper method of utilizing the sea's resources should not depend on a
coastal sovereign's capricious exercise of power for its resolution.
While unilateral action is unacceptable, any rule of international law
that is to develop realistically must take into account the sovereign
state's traditional demands. In order to posit a viable rule, international law must generate a reasonable accommodation,

27. See Ely, supra note 2, at 599-600.
28. Ely, supra note 2, at 601-10.
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equalization and interrelation between the conflicting demands and
needs of all nations. The proposed Act more clearly recognizes these
conflicting demands than does the Draft Convention. Whether the Act
will viably resolve the conflict remains to be seen from the course of
future negotiations.29
Mark R. von Sternberg

29. Significantly, Congress may be influenced by domestic as well as
international or transnational considerations. The need for some type of unilateral
action by the United States for purely domestic reasons is evident in a
Massachusetts territorial extension act. For a complete report of this act see
pp. 490-96 supra.
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